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ABSTRACT
We use case study techniques to analyze the determinants of the marked pro-
ductivity decline experienced by the textiles sector in Argentina since 1996. We 
find that, given the observed complementarity in the qualities chosen by di-
fferent firms in this sector, low productivity results from a failure to coordina-
te in the investment in quality upgrading technologies by all firms. The sector 
was pushed to a poor productivity equilibrium by adverse financial shocks that 
combined with capital wedges to prompt some firms to invest in lower quality 
or to exit the market, propagating to the other firms through the quality com-
plementarity.
RESUMEN
Este trabajo analiza los determinantes del colapso en productividad del sector 
textil en Argentina desde 1996, empleando técnicas de estudio de caso. Dada la 
complementariedad encontrada en la elección de calidad por distintas empre-
sas, la baja productividad resulta de una falla de coordinación para invertir en 
tecnologías que mejoren la calidad. El sector fue empujado hacia un equilibrio 
de baja productividad por una combinación de shocks financieros adversos 
junto con imperfecciones crediticias que llevaron a algunas empresas a invertir 
en calidad inferior o a dejar el mercado, propagándose a las demás empresas a 
través de la complementariedad en calidades.
*  We are very grateful for the useful comments and suggestions of Carmen Pages and for the superb 
research assistance of Guadalupe Gonzalez. All errors are ours.
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I. Introduction
The object of this paper is to shed light on the wedges that may affect 
resource allocation and the productivity levels in the textile sector in Ar-
gentina. 
Special interest is placed on analyzing whether there exist govern-
ment and market failures that hinder reallocation of resources towards 
the most efficient firms, and that impede equating revenue productivity 
across firms. We are also concerned about how these failures affect the 
distribution of productivity itself. 
More specifically, we care about the differential impact of financial 
constraints; taxation; non-compliance with taxes and labor regulations; 
macroeconomic volatility; and trade restrictions. We are also concerned 
about the roles played by coordination failures that may hinder the pro-
vision of public goods that are required for the acquisition of bigger 
scales and better technologies. We additionally care about possible coor-
dination failures to develop different stages of the value chain that may 
also hamper the distribution of productivities and resource allocation. 
The textile value chain includes the following stages. First comes the 
processing of cotton fibre. The spinning stage, which generates the yarn, 
follows next. Then ensues the weaving and knitting stages, which gen-
erate the cloth. The fabrics then have to undergo different treatments, 
like bleaching and dyeing, to obtain the final product. Finally comes the 
apparel stage, which includes the production of clothing, linen, towels, 
upholstery, draperies, etc. 
In this study we are concerned specifically about the weaving and 
knitting stages, which are stages with apparent potential for competi-
tiveness and which have been subject to distinct shocks that appear to 
have distorted resource allocation and the distribution of productivity. 
The analysis includes the production of both woven and knitted fabrics. 
We include in our analysis the spinning stage, as many producers of 
fabrics are vertically integrated backwards. 
The textile and spinning sector in Argentina experienced an important 
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restructuring between 1991 and 1997, which led to substantial produc-
tivity growth (above the economy wide productivity growth), although 
sectoral production did not grow during that period. The combination 
of the large devaluation in Brazil in 1999, the large domestic recession 
between 1999 and 2002 and the growing financial constraints associated 
to capital outflows during that period shocked negatively this sector, 
both in terms of productivity and production. 
During this period and even during the recovery since 2003 sever-
al policy and economic shocks have distorted resource allocation and 
choices of scale and technologies. As a result labour productivity in the 
sector fell 45% between 1997 and 2002, and recovered only partially 
since then (the 2007 productivity was still 25% below 1997), while la-
bour productivity and TFP for the economy as a whole respectively fell 
30 and 18% between 1997 and 2002 and by 2007 had surpassed the initial 
levels. 
The bulk of the productivity decline was borne by the decline in 
sectoral output, which fell 65% between 1997 and 2002 and, while par-
tially recovering since then, in 2007 was still 38% below the 2007 level. 
Hence, the sector appears to have been subject to major shocks that both 
led to lower output and also to operate with less productive technolo-
gies and/or production techniques. Alternatively, it could also be the 
case that new wedges were introduced preventing the expansion of po-
tentially productive firms and establishments. These are the hypotheses 
that we explore in our research. The main suspects are financial distor-
tions, coordination failures within the sector and trade policy failures. 
One important feature appears to be the coexistence of firms that seek 
to base their competitiveness on product differentiation and quality, 
and firms that want to be cost-competitive, which is not possible due to 
global competition from cheaper foreign competitors. 
We conduct this research both by analyzing the available data on the 
pattern of allocation of resources and sales within this sector and on the 
distribution of labor productivity in this sector and, more importantly, 
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by undertaking a case study analysis based on interviews to relevant 
actors. We have interviewed most of the largest textile producers, both 
national and foreign owned, and of smaller firms with varying produc-
tivity levels. We conduct structured interviews in the manner of Javor-
cik, Keller and Tybout (2006).  
The results obtained regarding the nature of the capital wedges and 
coordination failures that hinder productivity in the sector can be ad-
equately interpreted using the O-Ring model of economic development 
proposed by Kremer (1993). 
Section 2 provides a macroeconomic and policy background and the 
stylized facts for the sector. Section 3 presents the industrial organiza-
tion of the textiles sector in Argentina, and the patterns of allocation and 
the distribution of productivity. Section 4 analyzes the different govern-
ment and market failures that affect resource allocation and productiv-
ity in this sector in Argentina. Section 5 sketches an O-Ring model of 
productivity decline for the textiles sector. Section 6 concludes. Appen-
dix 1 describes the design and implementation of the methodology and 
questionnaire employed in the case study analysis.
II. Macroeconomic and policy background and stylized facts for 
the sector
In this section we provide a sketchy macroeconomic and policy back-
ground. During the 1990s there was macroeconomic stabilization and 
openness to trade and capital flows, together with a favourable envi-
ronment for FDI. In comparison to the previous decade, during this pe-
riod a more predictable policy and regulatory environment prevailed 
over discretion. This was a period of fast growth and price stability until 
1998. This period witnessed trade liberalization, which started in the late 
1980s and deepened with Mercosur. There was some incipient real ex-
change rate appreciation, which was exacerbated after 1998. 
Based on CEPAL (2004), we learn that during 1993-1998 trade lib-
eralization and real exchange rate appreciation caused the textil sector 
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to experience a decline in production and a bigger decline in employ-
ment and hours, which raised labour productivity (see Figures 1a and 
1b). Real wages and other labor costs also fell significantly. This labor 
saving was the main mechanism used to raise competitiveness vis-à-
vis foreign competitors, rather than bigger investment and incorpora-
tion of technology. This period also showed increasing informality and 
firm exits. The existence of important fixed costs, especially in the yarn 
and woven fabrics sectors, made productivity contingent on produc-
tion levels.
Figure 1a: Textiles productivity 1997=100
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On the other hand, during this period the price stabilization facili-
tated access to bigger banking and, especially, commercial financing by 
suppliers. The first years of the 1990s actually witnessed stable produc-
tion levels until 1996; the actual decline started after 1997. 
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Figure 1b: Textiles production 1997=100
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Firms tried to move towards less tradable products and to more dif-
ferentiated products with bigger profit margins. The sub-sectors of wo-
ven fabrics and clothing suffered the bigger exit of firms and the biggest 
drop in installed capacity, while the subsectors that produced yarns and 
knitted fabric were much less shocked. The clothing sub-sector increas-
ingly moved into informality.
Different firms performed differently depending on whether they ben-
efited or not from national or provincial promotion regimes, and depend-
ing on their net worth and financial status. This heterogeneity appeared 
to create coordination problems along the value chain, which hurt the per-
formance of the more efficient firms and of the sector as a whole. 
Things changed for the worse when Brazil and other developing 
countries devalued after 1998, while Argentina kept its exchange rate 
fixed. Additionally, capitals started flowing out of emerging markets. 
Argentina started to experience a combination of fiscal unsustainability, 
loss of competitiveness and monetary contraction that eventually led to 
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the collapse of the convertibility regime in 2001-2002. Aggregate GDP 
fell 20% between 1998 and 2002 (11% in 2002), and per capita GDP de-
clined by 27%. The combination of real exchange appreciation, declining 
domestic demand and financial tightening was particularly damaging 
for the sector during this period.
In 2002 a huge devaluation (250% vis-à-vis the US dollar) occurred 
in order to facilitate the required current account reversal (8% GDP), 
restore competitiveness and public and private savings, and to melt 
down public spending and private debts. There ensued a period of high 
real exchange rate (at least until 2007) and of increasingly discretionary 
policies and government intervention in the goods and factors’ markets, 
which includes bigger and more discretionary taxes, stiffer labor regula-
tions, and more discretionary protection from foreign competition, in-
cluding within Mercosur. At the same time this period witnessed the full 
entry of China in world trade, and a leading role of Asia in the world 
trade of textiles. Argentine firms claim that a good share of the Asian 
competitiveness is based on export and production subsidies that gener-
ate an unfair competition. 
Despite all these rising distortions the economy grew very fast until 
2007 (around 8% per year on average between 2003 and 2007), helped by 
the initially large output gap, the boost to savings and investment pro-
moted by the devaluation and public debt restructuring of 2005 and the 
rise in the terms-of-trade, world growth, and very expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policies. Since 2006 the economy began to operate above 
potential GDP, and inflationary pressures started to mount. Since mid-
2008 the economy had started to adjust to the natural level of production 
through a monetary contraction and real exchange rate appreciation. 
The international financial crisis that exacerbated in September 2008, fis-
cal sustainability concerns and some bigger discretionary government 
interventions that have deteriorated severely the business climate have 
fostered capital outflows, reduced domestic and external demand and 
consumers’ confidence, sharply decelerating the economy.
REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA POLÍTICA DE BUENOS AIRES 56  |
The 2003-2007 period displayed a combination of lower labor costs, 
lower costs of public utilities (due to price regulations by the govern-
ment), and fast growing domestic demand, with sectoral domestic prices 
doubling in real terms because of the devaluation (see Figure 2). Firms 
in the textile sector also benefited from the debt melt down caused by 
the peso-ification of liabilities, although they still faced constraints to 
access banking credit. On the other hand, commercial credit from sup-
pliers was restored, and at the same time financing of consumption with 
credit cards reappeared. The surviving firms had bigger cash flows, big-
ger profits and restored liquidity. 
Figure 2: Textiles, sectoral costs and prices
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However, firms in this sector reacted by initially exploiting idle in-
stalled capacity rather than investing. As a result, exports grew little and 
domestic production was not enough to meet the fast growing domestic 
demand, resulting in rapidly growing imports despite the exchange rate 
advantage (see Figures 3a and 3b). 
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Figure 3a: Textiles Trade
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Figure 3b: Textiles Trade
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The levels of capacity utilization in the textile sector in Argentina in 
2002 were one of the lowest among manufacturing industries (see Fig-
ure 4).
Figure 4: Utilization of the installed capacity in 2002
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During 2002-2008, the textile sector showed one of the biggest rates in 
the growth of installed capacity among manufacturing industries (prox-
ied by comparing the growth in production vis-à-vis the change in the 
use of installed capacity) (see Figure 5).
By 2008, this sector had one of the highest levels of capacity utiliza-
tion among manufacturing industries (see Figure 6 in page 60).
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Figure 5: Growth of the installed capacity
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This suggests that there was some investment in the sector. However, 
the fact that sectoral exports grew little and that imports grew very fast, 
with an increasingly negative sectoral trade balance, indicates that the 
growth in production capacity fell behind the growth in demand. Addi-
tionally, our interviews reveal that there has been very little investment 
in technological upgrading since 2002, and that many investments tar-
geted less productive equipment with low scale economies. 
Financial constraints have exacerbated since 2002. In 2002 banking 
credit to the non-financial private sector amounted to 23% GDP while it 
currently represents only 12% GDP (and half of it finances consumption, 
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while in 2001 only 20% of these credits financed consumption). Sánchez 
and Butler (2008), estimate that financial constraints have become tight-
er since 2002 (especially for SMEs). The abnormally large cash flows of 
firms permitted the self-financing of investment. This possibility has 
been curtailed since mid-2008.
Figure 6: Utilization of the installed capacity in 20
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III. Industrial organization of the textiles sector, resource 
allocation and distribution of productivity
Here we provide a description of the industrial organization of the sub-
sectors that produce yarns and woven and knitted fabrics, along with a 
description of the distribution of productivities.
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The textile value chain includes clearly differentiated stages. First 
comes the production of cotton fiber, which undergoes several process-
es. Firstly, cotton is ginned, usually in the field, separating cotton fibers 
from seedpods. Then the manufacturing stages begin:
Spinning which makes yarn.•	
Weaving which makes cloth (knitted and woven fabrics). •	
The fabric then undergoes different treatments to obtain final •	
product, like bleaching and dyeing. The final use of the cloth will 
determine the treatments required. 
The final stage includes production of clothing and other apparel.•	
In Argentina, cotton production and ginning are undertaken by many 
different actors. We here focus on spinning, weaving and knitting.
III.1. Spinning
The spinning process has big scale economies due to the large fixed costs 
associated to the minimum scale and installed capacity required. This 
stage of the textile value chain is the most capital intensive. In Argentina, 
there are seven mills. Many of the biggest firms in the weaving sector are 
fully integrated and have their own yarn production. 
The spinning sector is quite concentrated, due to the large scale 
economies, the financial constraints to investment and the underdevel-
oped domestic and export markets. The largest producer is the domes-
tic-owned TNPlatex firm, which controls 60% of the domestic market. 
Other large spinners include Tipoití, Algodonera Avellaneda and Villa 
Ocampo Hilados. These firms are not vertically integrated with the pro-
duction of fabrics. Fifteen percent of the domestic market of yarns is 
supplied by imports.1
1. There are three types of yarns, which differ in their processing, required machinery, final quality and 
usage: open ended, “cardado,” and combed yarns. The yarns are used in final products that range from 
socks to mopping cloths. The one which offers the biggest productivity (5.3 tons per worker per month 
in a modern large scale plant) but lowest quality is the open ended. The traditional yarns offer interme-
diate quality (cardado) and high quality (combed) and many usages, and lower productivity than the 
open-ended (between 1 and 1.7 tons per worker, depending on the combinations of cardado and combed 
produced in each plant, the technology used, and the workers’ skills).
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The large manufacturers produce yarns of different qualities, using 
mostly cotton but also synthetic fibers. The largest firm can produce 
4,600 tons per month, has plants in 7 provinces, and 2,300 employees. 
The location of its plants is based on proximity to cotton supply and also 
on promotion regimes. It sells yarns with relatively little processing (like 
dyeing). Hence its clients are relatively large firms that have a minimum 
size to justify having their own dyeing installations. Its clients also in-
clude some vertically integrated producers of fabrics, which buy from 
it some yarns that they themselves do not produce. Sixty percent of its 
clients are knitters and 40% are weavers. 
III.2. Woven fabrics
The production of woven fabrics demands more resistant yarns than 
the knitted fabrics. The production of this fabric demands more mecha-
nical processing and a bigger investment in equipment, which creates 
bigger scale economies. The optimal production scale is significantly 
bigger than in knitted fabrics. The woven fabrics sub-sector is conside-
red to be the potentially most competitive sub-sector within the sectoral 
value chain. It is less capital-intensive than spinning, and has lower 
barriers to entry.2
In this sector there co-exist firms of different sizes, technological 
productivities and capabilities, both of domestic and foreign (Brazil-
ian) ownership. There are about 300 firms in this sub-sector. This sub-
sector is populated by large firms that satisfy the demands for higher 
quality products and by a large number of smaller firms that produce 
cheaper lower quality fabrics that are bought by manufacturers of 
cheaper apparel. The smaller firms serve 50% of the domestic market. 
Many large firms are vertically integrated with the spinning stage and 
have scale economies.
There is a sizable productivity gap between both groups of firms. 
2. Denim is the woven fabric that requires the biggest scale. It demands the use of machines for dyeing 
the yarn that are amortized only when processing a large volume of fabrics (20km of yarn or 20,000 m2 
of fabrics). Eighty five percent of these fabrics are used to produce jeans.
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This co-existence is made possible by the fact that the groups target two 
different market niches. 
The largest firms include Alpargatas-Argentina, Grafa-Santista, San-
tana and Algoselan. We do not have data on productivity for these indi-
vidual firms, but according to the opinions of our interviewees the Bra-
zilian owned Santana shows the highest productivity, because it has in-
corporated the machinery with the latest technology. Grafa-Santista (also 
Brazilian) is perceived to have the second highest productivity, followed 
by Alpargatas and Algoselan. Alpargatas is devoted both to textiles and to 
the manufacture of sports shoes (Topper brand); it is vertically integrated 
from cotton processing to spinning, weaving and dyeing.3
Santana is a Brazilian owned firm that had been exporting to Argen-
tina from Brazil during the past 12 years. Approximately 3 years ago 
they got installed in the industrial park of Puerto Tirol in the Province 
of Chaco, to take advantage of an industrial promotion regime that pro-
vides provincial tax exemptions (on gross revenue taxes and other dis-
tortionary taxes). Their plant has cutting edge technology. In order to 
ensure high quality, 98% of their production is first quality; they are 
completely integrated from cotton to fabrics. It specializes in the pro-
duction of denim.
Algoselan-Flandria is Argentine owned. It specializes mostly in den-
im. However, it also produces other woven fabrics such as gabardines, 
canvas, rubber treated fabrics for shoes, and others. In the production 
of these fabrics it specializes in the segments of upholstery and tennis 
shoes. It buys some of its fabrics from other small and large manufactur-
ers, and finishes processing them itself.
Then come a group of Argentine-owned intermediate scale firms, like 
Torca and Karatex (which are located in the Province of La Rioja), and 
other smaller scale firms, like Estampados Rotativos (which is located 
3. Alpargatas is in the process of being absorbed by Santista. The main interest of Santista lies in acquir-
ing the Topper shoe brand. Santista is already one of the leaders in the woven fabric market in Argen-
tina through Grafa, and it is hence expected that they will sell the textile operations and capacities of 
Alpargatas.
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in Parque Industrial villa Flandria in Luján, in the Province of Buenos 
Aires and started as a dyeing firm), and Printel, which mostly processes 
and finishes fabrics made by smaller firms through contract manufac-
turing.
Finally come the smallest fabric weavers, which are located in Luján 
and which are spinoffs of Algodonera Flandria S.A., which closed in 
1996. These small firms usually produce through contract manufactur-
ing for distributors such as Printel or Estampados Rotativos, who do 
the dyeing and finish the fabrics. This outsourcing occurs because the 
finishing process, especially dyeing, demands a scale that is beyond the 
(financial and market) possibilities of the small firms.4 There also are 
small firms devoted to producing fabrics for upholstery and drapery, 
which are located mostly in Quilmes (Greater Buenos Aires area). Pro-
duction and finishing of these fabrics demands a lower scale than the 
other fabrics, facilitating its production by SME; the main type of fabric 
(jacquard) allows the yarn being dyed before converting it into fabric, 
which saves on machinery and scale (the other fabrics have to be dyed 
after being manufactured).
Algodonera Flandria S.A. was a leading textile firm located in Luján 
that had been operating since the 1920s and which in the 1960s employed 
more than 2,500 staff. It went bankrupt in 1996, and its production facili-
ties and machines were acquired by Algoselan in 2001. Algoselan uses 
part of these facilities and has devoted and reconverted the rest to cre-
ate an industrial park (Industrial Park Villa Flandria). This industrial 
park accommodates the above mentioned contract manufacturing small 
weavers, which rent the facilities from Algoselan.
To give an example of the kind of specialization patterns which may 
emerge in the sector we can highlight the story of Estampados Rotati-
vos. This is a sixty-one year old firm that is a weaver and which also pro-
vides finishing services for fabrics manufactured by others. The finish-
4. A dyeing machine for woven fabrics, like RAMA, costs about U$S 2 millions (most of the independent 
dyers shut down in the 1990s).
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ing services are allocated 60% to own fabrics and 40% to others’ fabrics. 
Seventy percent of the own fabrics are produced by the firm itself and 
the rest is acquired through contract manufacturing from small firms. 
The firm initially specialized in dyeing and fabric finishing for contract 
manufacturers, employing only 10-15 workers. In a second stage they 
started to sell their own products, obtained from contract manufactur-
ers in exchange for dyeing and finishing services. During this stage they 
started to grow. Then they moved on to buying unfinished fabrics and 
finishing and commercializing them. Finally they installed weaving facili-
ties. In 2005 they decided to expand, to which end they installed a weaver 
in the Flandria Industrial Park, renting space that was already apt for tex-
tile production. They currently employ 199 workers. They do not produce 
yarns, but rather buy them from firms like Colortex and Tecotex. 
III.3. Knitted fabrics
The production of knitted fabrics has smaller scale economies than the 
production of woven fabrics, and requires less installed capacity, which 
lowers the barriers to entry. Hence there are a larger number of firms 
than in the weaving sector.
Knitted fabrics use yarns that are softer and more fragile. Production 
of knitted fabrics is quite rapid and requires low scale: 2 machines gen-
erate 25 kg of knits per hour. Production of knitted fabrics requires good 
quality in cotton, cotton processing, and yarn making and processing. 
There is some specialization by market niches (women’s underwear, for 
instance) and also some more standard products.5
This sector is more atomized. It is populated mostly by 500-600 small 
and medium size firms, many of which produce high quality products. 
There are 8 large or medium-large firms, and only two of them are verti-
cally integrated to the spinning stage, using very modern technologies. 
5. There are important developments in the production of knitted fabrics for sports clothing, especially in 
the high performance segment, although in Argentina only the final processes are undertaken; the yarn 
with cutting edge technology incorporated is imported and the only the knitting is done here, so as to 
adapt the fabric to the latest fashion.
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This sector presents bigger informality rates than woven fabrics. It is 
also more competitive and homogeneous than woven fabrics, and there 
is bigger entry and exit and job turnover. The spinners that are the most 
important suppliers to manufacturers of knitted fabrics are Tipoití and 
TNPlatex.
The sector enjoys some natural barriers to foreign competition due to 
the frail nature of the knits, which can be damaged during their trans-
portation.
Producing knitted fabrics requires good quality in the different stag-
es. The domestic SME compensate the lack of scale with much shorter 
response cycles and the ability to provide smaller lots than in the case 
where the fabrics have to be imported. This capability for quick and flex-
ible response is a key for being competitive in the sector that is subject 
to rapid changes in fashion. This competitiveness is lost when there are 
failures in the supply of cotton and good synthetic fibers and in the ac-
cess to dyeing services.
III.4. Apparel
The apparel sector has high rates of informality (74% of sectoral emplo-
yment is unregistered). The sector is characterized by the presence of 
a large number of small informal firms and a large degree of interme-
diation between production and retail. Intermediation is undertaken by 
“production organizers.” The sector is highly labor intensive, and very 
vulnerable to foreign competition (when it seeks to compete via lower 
costs). In some cases, firms that produce branded products also under-
take some more capital intensive activity like cloth cutting.
Since the opening of the economy in the late 80s-early 90s the strat-
egy of some firms was to specialize in brands (the most profitable line 
of business), while others (the majority) to compete via lower costs by 
appealing to informality.
Most firms that sell branded products undertake the design and dis-
tribution activities themselves, but the production is outsourced. The 
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production organizer is in charge of intermediating in this outsourcing 
process, which is not subject to standardized processes and which is 
subject to large variability in the final quality of a same product. Often-
times the contract manufacturers outsource themselves the contracted 
production, creating a chain of outsourcing which further lowers quality 
control and the possibility to exploit any scale economies. Price competi-
tiveness is achieved via informality. Most producers of apparel operate 
at a very low scale, with poor technologies. 
There are a few exceptions of formal and highly productive firms, 
like Mauro Sergio (Textilana), which has a very modern and high tech 
integrated production process. This firm is much more productive than 
the firms that outsource production. 
III.5. Size and productivity distribution
The Annual Industrial Survey (AIS) conducted by INDEC provides hard 
data on sectoral productivities. Information is available at the firm level, 
albeit only in per worker terms and no weights for each firm are pro-
vided. The only ‘size’ measure in the database is a categorical variable 
that takes value 1 for small firms (between 10 to 80 employees), 2 for 
medium sized firms (81 to 200 employees) and 3 for big firms (more than 
200 employees). Textile products are included in sector 17 of industry 
classification (apparel belongs to code 18). There are 194 observations in 
2003, down from 352 in 1997. 
The Survey’s level of aggregation bundles together the spinning and 
fabrics sector. Hence the changes in the observed distribution of produc-
tivity and sizes may reflect both reallocation within each of these sub-
sectors or across these sub-sectors (which vary significantly in terms of 
sizes and technologies).
Between 1997 and 2003 there was a marked decline in the number of 
firms in the textile sector taken as a whole (see Figure 7). As discussed 
above, the sub-sector of woven fabrics was the one that suffered the big-
ger exit of firms.
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Figure 7: Textile products, number of firms
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Source: IERAL - Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC, EIA.
The textile sector has a high proportion (70%) of small companies. 
Between 1998 and 2001, medium sized firms have reduced their partici-
pation markedly, from 23% to 16% (see Figure 8). The reduction in the 
participation of medium sized firms is consistent with the concentration 
of exits in the weaving sub-sector.
Figure 8: Textile products, number of firms by size
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SáNCHEz / BUTLER |  69 
During 1998-2002 a reduction of labor productivity was observed for 
the sector as a whole. Mean productivity (measured as real value-added 
per worker) fell from an average of AR$85,600 to AR$62,900. During 
the same period the dispersion of productivity across firms increased. 
The coefficient of variation for labor productivity rose to 2.08 in 2002, 
up from 1.23 in 1997. Estimated productivity densities for those years 
show initially an increase in the participation of low productivity firms 
between 1997 and 2001, and then a recovery of the share of medium 
productivity firms in 2003 (see Figure 9). Between 1997 and 2003 there 
was a flattening of the distribution, with an expansion of the share of 
medium productivity firms. Hence the dispersion in productivity has 
increased over time, together with a lower average sectoral productiv-
ity. A misallocation towards low productivity firms cannot be blamed 
for the decline in productivity, but rather a lower investment in quality 
across the board.
Figure 9: Estimated density kernels of labor productivity
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Productivity dispersion is much bigger for small firms, which show 
the biggest coefficient of variation (2.27) (see Table 1). Although aver-
age productivity reaches $96,068, 50% of small firms have a productivity 
level below $54,587. Conversely, 50% of medium sized firm’s produc-
tivities are above $60,759. The observed gain in the participation of small 
firms has hence contributed to the increase in the dispersion of labor 
productivities.
Table 1: Labor productivity and dispersion across firm sizes
Size Mean Median
of variation
Small 96067,9 54 586,8 2,27
Medium 80992,9 60758,8 0,89
Large 49161,7 45542,1 0,23
Source: IERAL - Fundación Mediterránea based on INDEC, EIA
The stylized facts on productivity and size distribution are thus that: 
The total number of firms declined;•	
The number of exits was bigger for medium sized firms;•	
Labor productivity fell 26% for the sector as a whole;•	
The dispersion of productivities increased, with a decline in the •	
share of low productivity firms.
III.5.a. Firms’ technological choices
Here we provide an illustration of the differences in productivities across 
firms that compete in a same market segment of the woven fabrics sec-
tor, and of their abilities to capture more or less market share.
We consider the intermediate scale firms (Torca, Karatex, Estampa-
dos Rotativos, and Printel). Estampados Rotativos takes advantage of 
the large installed capacity and expertise and capabilities spun by the Al-
godonera Flandria. Karatex and Torca are bigger firms, which should be 
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able to exploit potentially bigger scale economies. However, both firms 
display less flexibility to accommodate changes in demand. This lower 
flexibility is associated to their bigger sizes (they need to produce big-
ger volumes of same types of fabrics, which are not always demanded). 
The smaller scale of Estampados Rotativos allows it to produce competi-
tively smaller lots, and to adapt more swiftly to changes in demand or 
to small demands of different lots. Its smaller scale also allows it to offer 
faster delivery and better quality in design and colors.6
Estampados Rotativos adjusts the quality of the fabrics to the de-
mands of customers and to market trends. In order to achieve a more 
uniform quality from contract manufacturers they give them quality 
norms and provide them with the yarns to be used. The contract manu-
facturer charges only the weaving service. This firm complains that 
the yarn that they have access to has a bad price/quality ratio. This 
firm avers that it has medium-high productivity (6-7 in a scale from 
1 to 10), whereas the contract manufacturers that it works with have 
productivities that range from 4-5 to 7-8, depending on the type of fab-
ric and the technology that they employ. Contract manufacturers have 
been investing in better technologies buying used mechanic looms of 
good quality. For these reasons they are not in the same league as the 
largest fabric manufacturers, for which 94-98% of their production is 
of top quality.
IV. Barriers to productivity gains
Next we move on to discuss the evidence arising from the interviews 
regarding distortions arising from government and market failures, re-
source allocation and the distribution of productivity.
We anticipate the conclusions, which are that low productivity is 
caused not so much by inefficient firms stealing market share from more 
productive firms because of distortions, but rather that the distortions 
6. Additionally, Karatex and Torca are both located in the Province of La Rioja, where textile workers 
have poorer skills than those available in Luján, which have accumulated sizable skills and capabilities in 
the long-standing contract manufacturing textile sector developed in that area.
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prevent potentially more productive firms from gaining scale, incorpo-
rating technology, and ensuring the required product quality. The most 
important distortions are financial market imperfections (which dis-
criminate against domestic firms, especially the smallest ones, relative 
to the Brazilian firms), and coordination failures in the form of miss-
ing links in the sectoral value chain, which hurt quality and scale. Some 
trade policy failures also appear to matter.
The market is segmented for firms with different qualities and pro-
ductivities, which serve different quality niches in the downstream. 
What this heterogeneity in qualities and productivities does is to pre-
vent the emergence of large and sophisticated enough customers and 
suppliers that may justify investing in bigger scale, and better technolo-
gies and qualities. But the solution does not appear to be to displace the 
less efficient but to increase productivity across-the-board.
Hence it appears that distortions hurt more via the distribution of 
productivity than through resource allocation. 
The sector as a whole seems to face an output tax arising from the 
coordination failures and a capital tax arising from unequal access to 
financing vis-à-vis foreign-owned firms. 
IV.1. Scale
There are potentially large scale economies in the spinning and woven 
fabric sectors which fail to be materialized due to coordination failures 
along the value chain and to the predominant technology choices made 
by firms in this sector.
The choice of scale in Argentina in the fabric sector is associated to 
the choice of technology and to the scales, productivities and qualities 
of firms in the upstream and the downstream. In Argentina the spinners 
are the largest firms, the weavers and knitters have smaller scale, and 
the firms in the apparel and commercialization stages have the lowest 
scales. These scales are conditioned by technology choices made in each 
stage. The way the size distribution of firms is established across sub-
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sectors in Argentina, the upstream firms must “push” the downstream 
companies in order to ensure that the former operate at full capacity. 
Some firms in the fabrics sub-sector would like to operate at a bigger 
scale (and with better technologies), but are hurt by financing constraints 
and coordination failures.
This market structure is opposite the one observed in the United 
States, where the retailers (JCPenny, Macy’s, etc.) have bigger scales than 
the firms that manufacture  wearing apparel (such as Levi’s), which in 
turn have bigger scales than weavers and spinners (like Corn Mills). The 
market structure in the US works well, because this is a very seasonal 
market, and highly sensitive to rapid changes in demand. 
Hence it is better to have a larger downstream that pulls the upstream 
stages and that reacts rapidly to changes in demand. Instead in Argen-
tina, the upstream must produce ahead of demand, and try to “impose” 
the fabrics to be used, which is not how the market works. This insuf-
ficient scale in the downstream prevents weavers and spinners from op-
erating at bigger scale and productivity. 
IV.2. Technology
There have been important technological changes in the world that 
allow reducing the requirements of infrastructure (plant area), which is 
a very expensive input. These changes have doubled the production per 
m2 in a very short period of time. However, in Argentina the process of 
investing in the adoption of these latest technologies is stuck, especially 
in the area of woven fabrics (there has been a bit more investment in te-
chnological upgrading in the area of knitted fabrics). Interviewees claim 
that this is due to the coordination failures observed in the sector and to 
financial constraints. More generally, in order to move steadily towards 
bigger quality and product differentiation it is required to incorpora-
te specific equipments with embodied technologies both for processing 
and finishing the fabrics; it is not enough to adopt good manufacturing 
practices that strengthen design and quality. 
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Within the woven fabrics sub-sector, only Santana made a top-of-
the-line investment in new technology, which is vertically integrated 
since cotton processing all the way up to production of finished fab-
rics. This firm invested in high technology machines, which are the most 
advanced in the world today. This way they have managed to become 
the cheapest producers of fabrics in the American continent. This tech-
nology is highly capital-intensive. It allows producing 1 million m2 per 
month with 300 employees, whereas its closest competitors in Argentina 
need more than 1,000 workers to achieve the same monthly production. 
Ninety eight percent of this firm’s output is of top quality.
According to CEPAL (2004), the recovery of production in this sector 
in 2003 was based on the re-opening or bigger utilization of installed ca-
pacities that were already amortized and far from the world technology 
frontier. While there was investment since then, the lack of productivity 
growth was directed towards less productive and low-scale technologies. 
IV.3. Access to finance
The textile sector (fabrics) is capital intensive, and is becoming more ca-
pital intensive over time. The latest generation looms are becoming in-
creasingly wider, in a way that significantly boosts productivity but also 
significantly increases the amount to invest.
Indeed, the textile sector (yarns and woven and knitted fabrics) in 
Argentina shows the biggest financial dependence among all the manu-
facturing sectors (see Figure 10). Financial dependence is proxied in this 
work by the stock of banking credit allocated to firms in the sector rela-
tive to the gross value of sectoral output. Rajan and zingales (1998) also 
find the textile (woven and knitted fabrics sector) to be one of the most 
dependent on external finance in the United States.
This means that in the presence of financial constraints (as estimated 
by Sánchez and Butler, 2008), the cash flows of firms in this sector may 
not be enough to undertake the desired investments.
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Figure 10: Financial dependence in manufacturing
Sectoral banking credit stock in % of gross value production (2007)
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According to our interviews, all the stages of the textile value chain 
in Argentina present important capital shallowing. The interviewed 
firms that are Argentine owned point out to financial constraints as 
the main culprit for insufficient investment in the stages of spinning, 
weaving, knitting and dyeing (together with coordination failures). 
They consider that their Brazilian competitors have access to much 
better financing from the BNDES (National Development Bank), which 
enables them to invest in the optimal scales, and also to do large and 
productive Greenfield investments with cutting edge technology (like 
the one made by Santana) and to acquire Argentine firms.
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The lack of access to financing explains the increasing participation 
of foreign capital in the ownership structure of domestic textile firms. 
When there is scarcity of financing both of investment and working cap-
ital, firms end up being sold. The fact that financial constraints currently 
appear to be binding also suggests that firms’ own cash flows for self-
financing have dwindled significantly. 
This constraint appears to be generating a widening gap between 
foreign-owned firms that have access to financing investment and the 
acquisition of technology, and domestic owned firms, which have less 
adequate scales and technologies. Our interviewees avow that if more 
adequate financing were available, there would be significant invest-
ment in all stages, which suggests that this capital tax is hurting the 
distribution of productivities in the sector.
The problem is magnified by the fact that upstream producers have 
to obtain financing not only for themselves, but also for their down-
stream customers (which they finance with commercial credit). Current-
ly not even the largest firms have adequate access to financing, which 
has forced them to cut down on financing customers. While in times of 
macroeconomic stability in the early 1990s the commercial loans maturi-
ties reached up to 150 days, whereas currently suppliers like TNPlatex 
have reduced the commercial financing maturity to 30 days.
IV.4. Informality
Our interviews reveal that labour and tax informality (low compliance 
with output taxes and with labor taxes and regulations) in the spinning 
sub-sector is not an issue because all the firms in the sector are necessa-
rily large (because of the minimum required scale), visible and subject 
to tax auditing. If any of their customers is informal, it has to pass its tax 
costs (like the value-added tax) to its downstream clients. 
Labour informality rates in the spinning and fabrics sectors taken to-
gether decrease significantly with firm size (see Table 2 below). There is a 
huge discrete decline in labour informality when moving from firms with 
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less than 6 employees to firms between 6 and 40 workers, and an even big-
ger decline when moving to firms with more than 40 employees. 
Firms in the spinning sector all have more than 40 employees. The 
large and intermediate scale manufacturers of woven clothes also fall 
in this size category. Small weavers, contract manufacturers and most 
fabric knitters fall in the below 40 category. Hence informality increases 
as we move downstream, which is coincidental with the distribution of 
scales across sub-sectors. The average for the sector as a whole in the 
second half of 2006 (latest available reliable datum) was around 30%, 
significantly less than the downstream apparel sub-sector (above 70% 
informality rates), and the economy wide informality rate (around 45%). 
Small producers in the fabrics sub-sector tend to be informal, and they 
represent 50% of sales in the woven fabrics sector (and a larger share in 
the knitted fabrics sector).
Table 2: Labor informality in the spinning and fabrics sectors
Textiles (1700) Quarter and year
Firm size (number 
of workers) II -03 I -04 II -04 I-05 II -05 I-06 II -06
Less than 6 95,91% 72,64% 93,63% 81,14% 52,68% 70,70% 66,67%
Betwe en 6 and 40 66,42% 26,69% 35,34% 53,66% 35,00% 46,99% 31,18%
More than 40 12,79% 13,86% 20,74% 8,67% 16,17% 17,39% 9,20%
Unreported size 69,53% 36,12% 32,31% 62,74% 39,73% 29,90% 57,19%
Sector average 52,00% 30,09% 36,72% 45,40% 30,51% 37,71% 29,92%
Source: IERAL - Fundación Mediterránea based on Permanent Household Survey
Non-wage labour costs increase labour costs 45% over wages. Evad-
ing payroll (and other) taxes in the fabrics sub-sector may allow the sur-
vival of less efficient producers. However, these informal firms are not 
considered to steal market share from the more efficient firms. Indeed, 
the more productive firms aver that markets are somewhat segmented, 
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with informal firms trying to compete via prices rather than via quality, 
which is very difficult given the lack of international competitiveness in 
this sub-sector. Larger and formal firms seek to base their competitiveness 
on quality and scale economies, and target different market segments that 
are less threatened by international competition. Nevertheless, informali-
ty, especially in the apparel sub-sector conspires against the emergence of 
large producers and retailers in this stage, which in turn hurts upstream 
firms, which are discouraged to invest in scale and technology.
IV.5. Coordination failures
Our interviewees coincide in pointing out the lack of coordination among 
the different stages in the sectoral value chain as the main hindrance that 
hurts the productivity distribution and that acts as an output tax which 
prevents the expansion of more efficient firms. They state that all the 
stages must act in a coordinated fashion for the sector as a whole and for 
individual firms to be competitive. For instance, there remain important 
bottlenecks in the provision of high quality services for the finishing of 
the product (like washing and dyeing; many dyers closed in the 1990s), 
which hinder the investment in technological upgrading by weavers, 
which in turn lowers the demand for these services. The lack of these 
services conspires against the product differentiation that would justify 
investing in superior technologies.
The fabric manufacturers that we interviewed state that it is neces-
sary to have access to good quality cotton and yarns. Some of them con-
sider that the largest spinners do not offer adequate quality yarns, which 
hinders productivity and quality in all the downstream stages, all the 
way down to retail. 
These fabric manufacturers consider that the distribution of scales 
along the value chain hurts this coordination. Due to this distribution there 
is not an adequate upstream transmission of the characteristics (quality, 
types, designs, etc.) of the yarns and fabrics that final consumers demand. 
As a result if upstream spinners decided to sell higher quality yarns they 
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would have to use their arms-length relations (or to vertically integrate) 
with cotton producers and weavers and knitters to generate more uni-
form high quality, and also to promote a bigger orientation of the apparel 
sector towards product differentiation. However, they do not have suf-
ficient incentives to do so and as a result they are seen to offer average or 
low quality yarns. This hinders the sectoral competitiveness, and prevents 
weavers and knitters from achieving bigger quality and productivity. 
Some big spinners, both directly and through business associations, 
are seen to focus their efforts on lobbying for protection for themselves 
and their customers instead of focusing more on training, investment, 
export promotion and brand development. There are other vertically in-
tegrated spinner/weavers that are more integrated through arms-length 
relations with their customers and which promote bigger quality uni-
formity. However, their strategy is to compete via lower costs, which is 
considered not to be feasible in Argentina. 
There are only a few cases of producers of differentiated wearing 
apparel that have arms-length relations with SME suppliers that, while 
being expensive, offer good quality and services, and the possibility 
of doing joint developments in the area of colours and designs. There 
are some relatively limited initiatives to form industrial districts where 
some producers of differentiated apparel provide training and financial 
support to textile SME that supply them. But this is the exception rather 
than the rule.
Alpargatas in the past used to sponsor designer competition every 
year. Winners received not only the award, but also training and the fi-
nancing of visits and contacts with designers and manufacturers abroad. 
This competition was discontinued. Many of the top designers in Argen-
tina had been winners of this competition. This type of adequate coor-
dination also existed when Alpargatas had an arms-length relation with 
Levi’s by which it supplied it with denim. Due to Levi’s demands, Al-
pargatas had to raise its quality standards.
For the interviewed fabric producers the optimal thing would be to 
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imitate the “Italian model.” In Italy there exist many creative SME in the 
apparel sector and one large retailer that transmits market demands, 
exploits scale economies in retailing, and provides financing for suppli-
ers. This generates an adequate backward transmission of demands for 
uniform quality that permits weavers and knitters to produce at bigger 
scales and invest in technology, and to transmit the demand for higher 
quality yarns.
This coordination failure, especially the insufficiently developed net-
work of arms-length relationships, makes smaller firms very vulnerable to 
macroeconomic shocks, especially to credit crunches. Tax and labor infor-
mality in the downstream apparel sub-sector appears to be very relevant 
for the occurrence of the coordination failure, hindering the emergence 
of large relevant firms that “pull” the upstream. The lack of large apparel 
firms can be attributed to unfair competition from informal firms and to 
the incentives to remain small and “invisible” to the tax authority.7
IV.6. Trade policy and international competition
Fabric makers complain that unfair international competition is a big 
threat that hurts the ability to solve the coordination failures and that 
discriminates against the ability of domestic-owned firms to acquire bi-
gger productivity.
There is intense international competition at all the stages of the tex-
tile value chain. The imports of yarns and fabrics represented 11% of 
domestic absorption in 1997, 21% in 2001, 8% in 2002 and 24% in 2007. 
On the other hand, sectoral exports represented 6% of the gross value of 
production in 1997, 13% in 2001, 18% in 2002, and 15% in 2007. Imports 
almost doubled exports in 2007.
Imports of yarns in 2008 represented almost 15% of domestic absorp-
tion. It is claimed that this subsector is  highly hurt by these imports, 
especially those from India and from Brazil, which appear to receive 
7. This large prevalence of informality is consistent with multiple equilibria in tax compliance. If most 
firms comply, the probability of catching evaders is larger, discouraging informality. The opposite ha-
ppens when most firms fail to comply.
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important indirect subsidies through sectoral support policies and sub-
sidized credits. Exports of yarns represent 5-10% of sectoral production 
and are close to reaching a historical minimum supposedly because of 
the real exchange rate appreciation accrued until 2008 (which is being 
reverted now). They claim that it currently is not possible to export to 
Brazil and Europe because of the loss of cost competitiveness, and that it 
is becoming too difficult to export to Chile for the same reason. 
Manufacturers of fabrics are equally hurt by imports, especially 
those coming from Asia. It is claimed that the Asian exporters benefit 
from significant subsidies to the use of labour and energy, which makes 
domestic firms unable to compete cost-wise (hence the need to focus 
on quality/differentiation). Argentine firms can compete with imports 
coming from Brazil, which have an average value of U$S 2 per kg. But 
they cannot compete with imports originating in China, which have an 
average value of U$S 0.99, and which are considered to be unfair compe-
tition. The same complaints apply to apparel originating in China and to 
the apparel made in Paraguay using Chinese fabrics.
Local producers consider that the Argentine government is too slow 
to apply adequate trade restrictions that countervail the Chinese subsi-
dies, although they recognize that some reference price and antidump-
ing policies have been implemented.
Manufacturers of commoditized fabrics are also hurt by the fast 
growth of imports of apparel.
Fabric manufacturers consider that with “reasonable” exchange rates 
they can compete, but that even at the current real exchange rate they 
can compete provided they focus on design and differentiation, where 
they are hurt by coordination failures.
International asymmetries in access to financing are seen to be very 
important, because the sectoral value chain is facing severe financial 
constraints. This asymmetry hinders the competitiveness vis-à-vis Bra-
zilian manufacturers, which have access to cheap financing and which 
also have higher productivities (because of domestic market size, access 
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to financing, and better coordination within its textile value chain).
Some fabric makers consider that it is not enough to focus on policies 
that protect against unfair competition. They aver that without overcom-
ing the coordination failure observed and easing financial constraints, 
the sector will not be competitive. They think that there is also need 
to implement export promotion policies and policies that help cultivate 
export markets. It is considered that Argentina has an unexploited com-
petitive advantage in design and branding.
Trade policy appears to act as an output tax on domestic-owned 
firms. Brazilian-owned firms in Argentina are less hurt by this policy, 
as they are part of integrated networks of Brazilian-based regional com-
panies and exploit it to somehow get preferential access to the Brazilian 
market. But perhaps the biggest wedge is the combination of interna-
tional competition with access to subsidized inputs (especially capital) 
with local financial constraints that prevent Argentine-owned firms to 
invest in the optimal scales and technologies (Brazilian-owned firms get 
access to subsidized credit from Brazil). 
The combination of apparently inadequate trade policies, together 
with coordination failures along the value chain and financial constraints 
prevent potentially more efficient local firms in the fabrics sector from 
investing in better technologies, operating at larger scales and improv-
ing productivity and quality.
IV.7. The supply of cotton
The coordination problems that distort the sector are exacerbated by an 
inadequate supply of cotton. The textile industry naturally locates in 
countries that produce cotton. 
Argentina has a natural comparative advantage in the production of 
cotton, and used to have an adequate supply of this product. However, 
the combinations of bad policies, together with a series of poor harvests, 
have led to a significant reduction in the planted area and in production 
(see Figures 11a and 11b). The expansion of the soy planting frontier by 
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virtue of the adoption of direct seeding techniques and the adoption of 
transgenic seeds that are resistant to glyphosate significantly contrib-
uted to this decline in the planting and producing of cotton.
Figure 11a: Cotton Production
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Figure 11b: Cotton, Seeded Surface
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Argentina even used to be a net exporter of cotton, but since 2002 it 
became a net importer (see Figure 12). An adequate supply of cotton is 
not guaranteed now that Argentina has to relay on imports. Addition-
ally domestic cotton prices have become more volatile.
 
Figure 12: Cotton Argentine Trade
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IV.8. Macroeconomic fluctuations
Demand for textile products is highly sensitive to macroeconomic cycles, 
and especially the demand for “commoditized” textiles, which compete 
on a price basis. When there is high volatility, there is a large degree 
of substitution among suppliers, and “spot” sales may drop drastically 
from one day to the next (spot sales are those that do not involve specific 
product developments for certain clients).
The fabric making sector is capital-intensive and requires both ad-
equate production capacity and financing of working capital. Hence 
negative macroeconomic shocks affect mostly SME through lack of fi-
nancing and inability to invest. Only firms that are adequately capital-
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ized and/or have developed differentiated products survive economic 
downturns.
Therefore macroeconomic risk hurts especially the smallest firms. 
Downturns force them to exit the market, and their high financial vul-
nerability hurts their access to credit leaving them unable to finance the 
required investment in equipment and scale, which creates a vicious 
circle of insufficient investment and low access to credit. 
Since the textile value chain needs all the production stages to work in 
a coordinated fashion, the high vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks 
of the sub-sectors that are more populated by SME (which include also 
suppliers of specialized inputs such as buttons, zippers, anilines, etc., 
and fabric contract manufacturers and most apparel producers and re-
tailers) transmits volatility to all the sectors and firms in the value chain. 
It is claimed that industry of suppliers of specialized inputs has poor 
quality and quality control and assurance processes, making mistakes 
that are very costly to customers. 
Exchange rate fluctuations are particularly relevant, especially for 
those that produce more commoditized fabrics.
Hence macroeconomic volatility feeds into the output wedge (coor-
dination failures) and the capital wedge.
IV.9. Factors of competitiveness
We inquired in our interviews on the factors of competitiveness, which 
define which types of firms may thrive and overcome the constraints 
that hurt their access to bigger quality/productivity.
The two most important drivers of competitiveness in the fabrics seg-
ment are the price/quality ratios and the ability to deliver the products 
in short time and to adjust quickly to changes in the types of products 
being demanded caused by fashion cycles.
It is impossible for firms in a country like Argentina to compete with 
Asian producers via lower costs. Besides, as mentioned above, for com-
moditized fabrics there is large elasticity of substitution: due to exchange 
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rate fluctuations and/or foreign subsidies Brazilian importers frequently 
stop buying Argentine fabrics all of a sudden (these are spot sales of 
commoditized fabrics). For these types of products there are no arms-
length relations.
The biggest comparative advantages that Argentina has are in the 
areas of design and branding that enable product differentiation (in the 
apparel sub-sector). Hence one important factor of competitiveness for 
fabric makers is the development of arms-length relations with apparel 
producers aiming at generating differentiated products. Production al-
liances based on design and branding, which allow to charge higher 
prices for the apparel produced, compensate the undeveloped scale 
economies. Higher price sales of apparel pull the backward stages of 
the value chain. The development of telecommunications has created 
“universal” consumers of apparel. If an apparel firm hits it right with its 
product differentiation, there is large scalability without need of having 
lower costs.
In order to be competitive it is also important to have steady access to 
good quality cotton, and to spinners that are reliable providers of good 
quality yarns. If yarns are of low quality, then fabrics can at most offer 
intermediate quality.
Smaller fabric makers seek to base their competitiveness on the deve-
lopment of differentiated products (that compensate for scale economies) 
and/or, often times, via labor informality and tax evasion. The weavers 
and spinners located in the Luján area (Flandria Industrial Park) are in 
trouble because they are trying to base their competitiveness on lower 
costs, which makes them highly vulnerable to macroeconomic fluctua-
tions (exchange rate and financing).
We next illustrate how difficult it is trying to compete via low cost/
prices. For instance, in the case of woven fabrics that have patterns in-
cluding up to four colors (the case of sheets), individual Asian produc-
ers have production volumes of 1 million m2, which dwarf the local 
capabilities (2,000 m2) that do not allow exploiting scale economies. If 
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an Argentine, Brazilian or Chilean customer (the markets for Argentine 
fabrics) needs 100 or 200 thousand m2, it buys them directly in Paki-
stan. The Argentine suppliers of commoditized fabrics cover the market 
niche of customers buying less than 5,000 m2, which buy products with 
a slight differentiation (more colors) at a bigger price.
The demand patterns for woven and knitted fabrics are tied to rapid 
changes in fashion trends, making the ability to respond quickly to these 
changes a factor of competitiveness. A prevailing view in our interviews 
is that Argentine SME should try to compensate their lack of scale with 
much shorter “response cycles” (ability to deliver products fast in re-
sponse to changes in demand/fashion) and with shorter series of pro-
duction (smaller lots). It is possible for Argentine SME to compete based 
on short response cycles and design, without need to squeeze costs. 
However, bigger imports put bigger pressure on shorter response cycles 
and better design.
The textile market shows great volatility in the patterns of demand. 
Smaller firms may have more flexible production structures that allow a 
better adaptation to changes in demand (as in the above mentioned case 
of Estampados Rotativos vis-à-vis- Karatex and Torca).
Within the spinning sub-sector the competitiveness depends on the 
scale of production, the incorporation of state-of-the-art technology 
and the availability of good quality inputs at internationally competi-
tive prices. Since they operate mature technologies of production, the 
achievement of scale and technology is constrained only by access to 
financing, and also by the size of the market.
V. An O-Ring Theory of Productivity Decline for the Textiles Sector
The case of the textiles sector in Argentina is adequately captured by the 
O-Ring model of economic development developed by Kremer (1993). 
In Kremer’s model, production can be divided in either parallel or se-
quential tasks. Workers in each task can display different levels of qua-
lity, which is defined as “the expected percentage of maximum value 
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the product retains if the worker performs the task.” In this model the 
expected value of the marginal productivity of hiring bigger quality for 
a given task is bigger when the workers in the other tasks have big-
ger quality as well. The model is set in such a way that quality is equa-
lized across tasks within a given firm in the case of parallel tasks, or 
that bigger quality is allocated to the later production stages in the case 
of sequential production. In this model capital and worker quality are 
complements. In the case where the supply of quality is not exogenously 
given but rather results from a deliberate investment in quality acquisi-
tion by workers, there can emerge multiple equilibria in the availability 
and utilization of quality.  
In the case of textiles we can think of a version of Kremer’s model 
where there is sequential production, and where firms in each stage must 
choose which technology (quality) and how much (and what type of) cap-
ital to invest in. Each firm’s choice of technology (quality) would depend 
on the expected quality of the intermediate goods delivered by suppliers 
(which affect the expected marginal productivity of your own quality), 
and on the willingness to pay for quality by their customers (which in 
turn depends on their own qualities). These choices also depend on the 
cost of technology acquisition, which is largely embodied in capital. These 
technologies can be imported, at a given international price. 
Each firm’s choice of the amount of capital to employ depends both 
on its choice of quality and on the interest rate, which is exogenously 
given to the sector. Lower quality will bring down capital investment 
and viceversa. Given the Argentine capital market imperfections, the in-
terest rate faced by each firm may vary depending on its collateral, net 
worth and credit history. The choice of leveraging over self-financing 
may create different degrees of vulnerability to financial shocks. Ad-
ditional capital wedges may emerge from differences in the access to 
financing from headquarters (in the case of foreign-owned firms) and 
in the degree of tax and labor formality (more informal firms face more 
costly credit and/or have less access to institutional financing).
SáNCHEz / BUTLER |  89 
The sector is then characterized both by technological differences 
along the value chain, ranging from the more capital intensive spinning 
to the more labor intensive apparel, and by the quality choices made in 
each stage, which are correlated to the quality choices made both in your 
own stage and in the other stages.
There can be individual chains (arms-length relationships) where 
bigger quality firms get together. However, if there is imperfect match-
ing along the value chain (or capacity constraints that force you to use 
different suppliers with uneven quality), a sizable dispersion of quality 
together with low average productivity would lower the probability of 
finding a good quality supplier and/or customer, hence bringing down 
the incentive to invest in quality. What is more, if competing firms with-
in your own stage have low quality, bringing down the average quality 
in the stage, then in equilibrium there will be little demand for quality 
from your downstream customers (who find it more uncertain to match 
with good quality suppliers) and lower investment in quality from your 
suppliers (who find it more uncertain to match with demanders of good 
quality), further bringing down the incentive to invest in quality.  
In this setup, expected quality (and productivity) will be bigger the 
lower is the cost of capital, the lower are the output taxes (this is not 
considered in Kremer’s original formulation), and the bigger is the co-
ordination in investing in quality, both within and across production 
stages. Given the sequential production structure of the sector, if there is 
lower investment in quality in the downstream (clothing and apparel), 
then the returns to investing in quality fall across the board. Following 
Kremer’s model, small differences in firms’ skills along the value chain 
may create large differences in sector-wide output and productivity 
across countries. In this same vein, adverse financial and trade shocks 
that lower quality and capital of some firms (or force their exit) would 
lower the quality choices of other firms, with an exponential negative 
effect on sector-wide productivity, such as it was observed between 1997 
and 2003. These negative effects become worse when they prompt exit 
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of good quality firms, which introduces bigger uncertainty in the quality 
matching of surviving firms.
There is an additional dimension in the case of textiles, which is that 
there coexist differentiated products (higher quality products that fetch 
higher prices as they deliver bigger efficiency unit to consumers) and 
commoditized textiles (low quality undifferentiated products that fetch 
low prices). The segment of commoditized textiles is subject to the compe-
tition of Asian and Brazilian exporters, which is based mostly on prices.
Lower quality becomes especially problematic when perforating 
the floor at which textiles and apparel turn into commodities subject to 
Asian and Brazilian competition. At this point competition and survival 
become possible only when appealing to informality in the clothing and 
apparel stage, which feeds in to lower quality in the upstream.
The evolution of the distribution of productivity/quality in the sector 
since the 1990s can then be characterized in terms of the firms’ respons-
es to different adverse macroeconomic and external shocks. During the 
early 1990s trade liberalization and financial liberalization that reduced 
the cost of capital had countervailing effects on quality and productiv-
ity. Some firms were forced to exit, and others moved into informality 
to become competitive cost-wise, which hurt overall quality, but at the 
same time cheaper capital facilitated investment and the incorporation 
of technology. 
The adverse financial shocks of the late 1990s – early 2000s induced 
a capital shallowing and/or an important exit process of the firms that 
were financially more vulnerable (those with lower net worth and less 
access to government support), many of which displayed relatively 
large productivity. This exit lowered average quality, hurting the most 
productive firms, and prompting a process of lower investment in capi-
tal and quality across the board. Real exchange rate appreciation during 
this period further pushed many labor-intensive clothing producers into 
informality, with deleterious effect on quality. This trend was exacer-
bated by the competition of the Asian exporters, together with higher 
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non-wage labor costs since 2002, which further prompted lower quality 
and more capital shallowing in this sub-sector and in the upstream. 
These shocks hurt more the weaving sub-sector, which is relatively 
capital-intensive and which employs technologies that cannot be adapt-
ed to changes in the quality of fabrics being demanded and to the de-
cline in the quality of yarns, as opposed to the spinning sector. Weavers 
that had some vertical integration with the spinning and fabric finish-
ing stages (like dyeing) could ensure better quality and did better. This 
sub-sector experienced a larger exit of firms, together with low quality 
investment by survivors.
After 2002 domestic demand picked up and labor costs declined be-
cause of the devaluation. Domestic firms responded with bigger invest-
ment which was not however large enough, leading to a growing sec-
toral trade deficit. As discussed before, our interviews reveal that there 
has been very little investment in technological upgrading since 2002, 
and that many investments targeted less productive equipment with 
low scale economies. Most of the recovery of production in this sector 
in 2003 was based on the re-opening or bigger utilization of installed 
capacities that were already amortized and far from the world technol-
ogy frontier. This lack of investment in technology/quality appears to 
reflect the lower average quality in all stages and the quality bottlenecks 
caused by the previous shocks and also the financial constraints that 
followed the 2001-2002 banking crisis. The bigger availability of internal 
funds during the 2003-2008 was allocated mostly to expanding installed 
capacity without technological upgrading. As a result, sector-wide labor 
productivity remained stagnant since the late 1990s.
It can be argued that at the time when demand picked up there was 
a coordination failure to respond with bigger quality across the board, 
which was exacerbated by the prevailing financial constraints. The exit 
process was slowed down, but coordination failures prevented the en-
try of missing links and/or the productivity upgrade in surviving firms 
that would alleviate the bottlenecks. Hence moving to bigger quality/
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productivity would require both relieving financial constraints, and al-
leviating capital wedges, together with the introduction of policies that 
provide a “push” for investing in better quality/technology. Reducing 
informality in the downstream is another necessary condition for this 
quality upgrading to occur. 
In this vein, the labor-intensive downstream activities were hit by 
many relevant wedges that discriminated against them pushing them 
first into poorer quality choices and then into informality in an increas-
ing fashion, creating a vicious circle that eventually moved most of the 
sector into the production of commoditized goods. These wedges in-
clude: a) more stringent labor regulations since 2002, b) the growing 
Asian competition based on low costs, c) the coordination towards a 
“bad” equilibrium with low quality. These shocks led not only to lower 
quality in this sub-sector, but also to a lower investment in capital (be-
cause of higher cost of capital and/or wish to remain of lower size to 
avoid being audited, thanks to the existence of fixed costs of auditing), 
creating a vicious circle of low quality and low capital, moving the sub-
sector further away from the optimal firm size and quality. There is in-
deed a stark contrast between the large and high productivity clothing 
retailers and demanders of design in the United States, Italy or Spain, 
and the atomized low quality retailers, organizers of production and 
chains of production outsourcing in Argentina.
This model helps interpret the evolution of the levels and distribution 
of productivity when the sector was hit by these shocks. In 1997 there 
was a bigger share of low productivity firms, but average productivity 
was bigger (for all groups) than in 2003 and nowadays, and it was also 
the case that average productivity was also bigger within each group 
(low, medium and high productivity; additionally average productivity 
was bigger for the small, medium and large firms). On the other hand, 
in 2003 there was a bigger dispersion of productivity than in 1997, and 
medium productivity firms represented a bigger share of all firms, but 
average productivity was lower for the sector as a whole and for each 
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sub-sector (defined in terms of size and relative productivity) in par-
ticular. Hence firms across the board invested less in technology/quality 
(and in capital). The bigger dispersion of productivity can be attribut-
ed to the persistence of previous investments in better technologies by 
some firms that were made in response to bigger quality availability in 
the sector in previous times and that have not yet been fully amortized. 
The exit and capital shallowing processes caused by the combination of 
financial and external shocks, together with the growing technological 
backwardness of the downstream, brought forth lower probability of 
matching with higher quality firms, leading to an overall quality/pro-
ductivity decline. 
VI. Conclusions
Given the sequential production nature of the textiles and clothing 
sector, and the complementarities in the quality/productivity choices 
made by firms in different stages and within each stage of the sectoral 
value chain, distortions do not hurt productivity by causing misalloca-
tion (away from the most efficient firms) but rather by coordinating the 
firms’ quality choices towards a bad low productivity equilibrium.
The combination of adverse financial shocks, trade liberalization, re-
cession and real exchange rate appreciation during the late 1990s induced 
the exit of financially vulnerable firms, capital shallowing, and increas-
ing informality in the downstream apparel sector (which in turn created 
a bigger capital wedge against the informal firms). This process of exit, 
capital shallowing and growing informality led to choices of lower quality 
across-the-board that were self-reinforcing within the sector. 
When the currency was devalued, demand picked up and self-fi-
nancing constraints were alleviated after 2002, firms did not respond 
with productivity/quality upgrading because of a failure to coordinate 
towards better quality by surviving firms and to have the entry of firms 
that would alleviate bottlenecks. Moving to bigger quality/productiv-
ity would require both relieving financial constraints, and alleviating 
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capital wedges, together with the introduction of policies that provide a 
“push” for investing in better quality/technology. Reducing informality 
in taca tambienhe downstream is another necessary condition for this 
quality upgrading to occur.
The case of textiles shows how low productivity in some cases may 
not result from distortions that reallocate resources away from the most 
efficient firms, but rather from a combination of shocks and wedges that 
affect the technological choices of some firms that are then propagated 
to the other firms because of the quality complementarities. Given the 
sequential nature of production, this case also illustrates how wedges 
that affect the downstream stages are the ones that are more harmful, 
feeding back on the upstream through lower demand for quality and 
demand for different small lots that conspire against scale economies.
This case further sheds light on how recessions in some cases may not 
have a creative destruction effect that raises productivity by prompting 
the exit of the least efficient firms and the entry of firms that adopt the 
latest technologies. Indeed, when there are quality/productivity comple-
mentarities the exits may create disincentives for entry and help coordi-
nate towards a bad equilibrium. In this particular case there is the addi-
tional dimension that the capital shallowing caused by severe financial 
shocks further led to poorer quality choices that propagate through the 
sector. The caveat must be made that we are drawing this conclusion 
from an episode of economic depression, such as it was observed in Ar-
gentina during 1999-2002, rather than from a normal recession.
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A. Methodological Annex
A1. Design of interviews
We base our analysis on the interview methodology proposed by Javor-
cik, Keller and Tybout (2006). Interviews are conducted on the basis of 
topic modules. Although we have a standardized set of questions we 
want answered, the interviews are carried out as much as possible in a 
conversational manner, with interventions on our part to set the topics 
(change modules), to motivate further comments when the information 
is relevant to or in line with the objectives of the study, and to change the 
focus within a topic when the conversation veers off course. The inter-
view ranges from general topics to more specific topics and from “easy” 
topics to “more difficult” ones. 
The questionnaire is structured in a way that it first provides back-
ground information (history, business strategy, cost structure, financ-
ing mechanisms, human capital requirements, technology used, and 
risks and vulnerabilities faced) on the interviewed firm that will help 
understand better how the different wedges arising from government 
and market failures may affect its output/price, scale and technology 
choices. This part of the questionnaire also includes some questions re-
garding how some distortions affect the decision making of the firm.
The second part of the questionnaire seeks to extract information on 
the sector where the firm operates: What is its industrial organization? 
What is the role of FDI? Are there barriers to entry? What type of com-
petition prevails? Do some firms get special (positive or negative) policy 
treatment?
The third part focuses on the impact of government policies and reg-
ulations on the performance of the firm and the sector.
The questionnaire and the approach to the interviews are set so as 
to induce the interviewee to provide non-strategic answers to diffi-
cult questions. Direct questions are used only towards the end of the 
interview so as to obtain answers that are not offered during the con-
SáNCHEz / BUTLER |  97 
versation, or to shed light on unmentioned aspects or to test specific 
hypotheses. 
The specific questionnaire is presented next:
I. Information on the firm
1. Company’s history, structure and business model 
1.1. What is the ownership structure of the firm? (National or fo-
reign; number of owners; family firm; public offer firm; state-
owned company; structure)
1.2. What is its main market? (Domestic or foreign; national or 
regional; type of consumers targeted)
1.3. What is its business structure? (Vertical or horizontal inte-
gration; alliances with suppliers or retailers; technological 
alliances; outsourcing; etc)
2. Company’s strategy and product differentiation 
2.1. What is the firm’s place within the market? 
2.2. What are the firm’s main advantages with respect to its com-
petitors? What are the main disadvantages? 
2.3. Which internal, external and policy aspects are behind the 
firm’s advantages/disadvantages?  
3. Cost structure of the firm
3.1. Which are the costs that weigh in more heavily in the cost 
structure of the firm?
3.2. Are there significant fixed and sunk costs?
3.4. How important are transportation and distribution costs? 
3.5. Are there economies or diseconomies of scale? 
3.6. How important are interest rates? 
3.7. Are tax costs significant? 
4. Financing mechanisms and structure
4.1. How is the financing of the company structured? 
4.2. Has the company access to the capital market? 
4.3. Has it access to credit –domestic, foreign, public- or does 
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it finance itself with its own resources (equity, cash flow)? 
Why? 
4.4. Does it reinvest all its profits? 
4.5. Is financing an important issue? Does the company face fi-
nancial constraints on investment or innovation? 
5. Human Capital 
5.1. Is access to human capital a major concern? 
5.2. Is it part of the core business? 
5.3. Does the company invest in training employees? Why or why 
not?
5.4. Is it a bottleneck for expansion? 
5.5. Is it scarce in the market? 
5.6. What proportion of employees needs industry-specific trai-
ning? 
5.7. Do companies steal each other’s human resources? 
5.8. How do the company’s salaries compare to those of its com-
petitors? 
5.9. How does labor market informality in the sector affect the 
availability of skilled workers?
6. Technology
6.1. How does the technology employed by your firm and/or the 
quality of your products and services compare to the rest of 
the sector and to foreign competitors?
6.2. What is the main source of acquisition of technology by your 
firm?
6.3. Are there important barriers to technology acquisition?
7. Vulnerabilities and Risks 
7.1. How important is the domestic economic cycle to the 
company’s revenues?
7.2. Is political instability an issue? 
7.3. Is security an issue? 
7.4. Are there any risk-related barriers to growth?
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7.5. Are there fears of expropriation? 
7.6. Are financial risks significant? 
7.7. Are there institutional risks? 
7.8. Is policy credibility an important issue?
II. Information on the sector
8. Competition 
8.1. Has the industry reached its mature state? 
8.2. Are products significantly differentiated? 
8.3. Are there various market niches? 
8.4. Are there economies of scope? 
8.5. Is foreign competition important? Is it complementary? How 
important is the domestic market? 
8.6. Are barriers to entry important and effective? 
8.7. Are multinational firms important within this industry? Are 
they trendsetters? 
8.8. Does the industry association play a major role? 
8.9. Do firms have communications channels among them and 
with the government? 
8.10. Are there firm-specific government support policies (e.g. 
small firms, exporters, multinationals) and/or differences in 
access to financing that may hinder competition?
III. Incidence of government policies and regulations on the firm and sector
9. Government intervention and the firm
9.1. Has the company used horizontal industrial policies such as 
investment tax exemption regimes? Subsidized credits? 
9.2. Has the company benefited form sector-specific government 
policies? Subsidies? Credits? 
9.3. Has the company benefited from tax exemptions/deductions/
incentives? 
10. Treatment and impact of foreign competition and FDI
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10.1. Is there foreign competition and/or foreign direct inves-
tment? 
10.2. Has this competition been beneficial for the market and, if 
so, through which channels? 
10.3. Have supply chains and distribution chains evolved? 
10.4. Has there been an impact from the entry of large retailers? 
10.5. What is the effect of foreign competition on the restructuring 
of the industry and the performance of local competitors? 
11. Goods and factor markets regulations and policy interventions
11.1. Do labor market regulations prevent the achievement of op-
timal employment and scale of the company?
11.2. Do labor, tax and regulatory informality hurt the returns on 
investment? 
11.3. What other regulations hurt your competitiveness? How? 
How much?
11.4. Are these regulations applied equally to all firms in the sec-
tor?
11.5. Do regulations promote bigger informality?
A2. Implementation of interviews
Most of the interviews were done either personally or over the phone. 
We usually had sufficient time to go through the entire questionnaire, 
although at times we had to give priority to some questions due to lack 
of time. This was especially the case in the telephonic interviews. When 
some questions remained unanswered, emails were used to contact the 
interviewed and prompt answer was obtained. 
Most of the interviews followed the order presented in the question-
naire. We first explained to the interviewees that the goal of the research 
was to understand the determinants of “efficiency” and “competitive-
ness” of the textiles sector and how it is affected by market and policy 
distortions. We never asked the full set of questions presented in each 
of the sections of the questionnaire. We rather invited the interviewees 
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to discuss the general topic of each section. We asked them some of the 
more specific questions when they were not addressing them, or when 
they were veering away from the subject. The full set of questions was 
used to organize the answers obtained.
Our interviews were well received in the majority of cases, and inter-
viewees were enthusiastic to provide the required information. Howev-
er, in most cases it was not possible to obtain quantitative information. 
 
A3. Processing of the interviews
The interviews were processed along the structure of the questionnaire, 
taking into account the information and opinions of the different inter-
viewees about the firm, the sector and the policies and regulations that 
affect them.
This methodology extracted majority opinions, consensus and dis-
sentions. When available, secondary sources (firms’ websites, etc.) were 
used. 
When some previous interviews in the sector have been undertaken, 
some contradictory views on the same issue arose, especially among 
competitors. This entails that multiple sources of evidence had to be 
used. Interviewing multiple participants strengthened the robustness of 
the results.
A4. Choice of interviewed firms
As a first step, the biggest, usually better known, firms and most rele-
vant organizations of the sector were identified as the starting point. 
From these interviews, other relevant actors were identified. As a result, 
relevant smaller firms were identified in order to have a thorough un-
derstanding of different actors in the sector. 
The interviewees were: 
TNPlatex (Carlos Arial, Exports Manager )•	
Guillermo Gotelli, ex manager from Alpargatas and owner of •	
GGM Cordones, another textile enterprise. 
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Santana Textil, (Rodigo Caio, Director Comercial)•	
Alpargatas (Gustavo Frugoni, gerente de producción )•	
Estampados Rotativos (Victor Hugo Bocich, jefe Técnico)•	
PROTEJER, Sectoral Chamber (Mariano Kestelboim)•	
